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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
were amenable to process in New York State. 10 It should be noted that
this decision is in accord with the prior law on this point."
CPLR 203(b): In an impleader action by retailer for indemnification
from manufacturer, the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of
the manufacturer on the day of sale.
In Ibach v. Donaldson Service, Inc.,2 the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, held that the statute of limitations commences to
run on the day that a defective product is sold to the retailer and is
available as an affirmative defense to an impleaded manufacturer if
the statutory period expires before the commencement of the im-
pleader action.' 3 This decision was merely a logical extension of the
principles enunciated in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,' 4 where
the New York Court of Appeals held that a breach of warranty action
against the manufacturer of a defective product accrues on the date
of sale. Lamentably, this holding sometimes results in the statute of
limitations tolling before the potential plaintiff is injured or the po-
tential third-party plaintiff is sued. 15
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 301: Foreign corporation held not present within the state un-
der either "agency" or "control" predicates.
When is a non-domiciliary parent corporation, for purposes of
jurisdiction, "present" within the state by virtue of the acts its sub-
sidiary performed? Clearly, the mere presence of the subsidiary within
the state is not in itself a sufficient basis upon which to exercise juris-
diction over the parent corporation.'" Such jurisdiction has been up-
10 CPLR 207.
11 See Dominion of Canada Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pierson, 27 App. Div. 2d 484, 280 N.Y.S.2d
296 (Sd Dep't 1967); Glines v. Muszynski, 15 App. Div. 2d 435, 225 N.Y.S.2d 61 (4th Dep't
1962) (per curiam).
12 38 App. Div. 2d 39, 326 N.Y.S.2d 720 (4th Dep't 1971).
13id. at 45, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 726. Accord, Caruloff v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph
Corp., 445 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971); Perez v. Chutick & Sudakoff, 50 F.R.D. I (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
C.KS., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.YS.2d 56
(1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam); City & County Say. Bank v. M. Kramer & Sons, Inc., 43 Misc.
2d 731, 252 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964). See The Quarterly Survey, 46
ST. JOHN's L. REv. -, - (1972).
14 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). For an excellent critique of
the reasoning in the Mendel decision, see Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Company, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 62 et seq. (1970).
15 For further discussion of the impleader problem, see Siegel, Procedure Catches Up-
and Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 63, 69 (1970).
16 See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); REsTATEAENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L Ws § 52, comment b at 180-81 (1969).
[Vol. 46:768
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
held, however, where (1) the subsidiary, having no separate existence
of its own, is, in fact, a department of its parent corporation;17 or
(2) where the subsidiary functions in New York as the agent of the
parent corporation.'8
In the first instance, the corporate cloak of the subsidiary is com-
pletely disregarded; thus, any activity of the subsidiary may be included
in the "doing business" equation of the parent. However, where ju-
risdiction is predicated on the agency relationship between parent and
subsidiary, only the subsidiary's acts as agent may be charged to the
parent.' 9 In the latter situation, the subsidiary is a distinct corporate
personality whose activities are controlled in part by the non-domi-
ciliary parent. Precisely what degree of control by the parent warrants
a finding of agency for jurisdictional purposes?
On this point Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.20
indicated that where a subsidiary "does all the business which [the
parent] could do were it here by its own officials," 21 the foreign parent
is subject to in personam jurisdiction. The defendant in Frummer, a
British corporation, was deemed present within the state as a result of
the activities of its New York agent, Hilton Reservation Service. The
New York affiliate, operated on a non-profit basis, did publicity work
and public relations for the Hotel and, significantly, made and con-
firmed hotel reservations here. The Hotel and the Reservation Service
were in part commonly owned by Hilton Hotels International. 2 Dis-
cussing this interlocking relationship, the Court of Appeals noted that
"the fact that the two are commonly owned is significant only because
it gives rise to a valid inference as to the broad scope of the agency in
the absence of an express agency agreement .... "23
17 Public Adm'r of County of New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224
NE .2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England,
Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965), discussed in The Biannual
Survey, 40 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 122, 132 (1965).
18 Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 996 (1968), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 406, 415 (1965);
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoN's L. REv.
436, 444 (1968).
19 7B McKHNEm's CPLR 301, commentary at 10 (1972).
20 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (4-3), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
21Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
22 Hilton Hotels International, Inc. owned all but one share of the British corporate
defendant. International, a Delaware corporation, is partly owned by Hilton Hotels Corp.,
also a Delaware corporation. These two corporations jointly own Hilton Credit Corporation.
Hilton Reservation Service was a branch of this latter affiliate. Id. at 540, 227 N.E.2d at
855-56, 281 N.YS.2d at 47 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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In Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A G,24 a unanimous Court of Ap-
peals clarified this statement and the basis of the Frummer decision,
which arguably synthesized the "departmental" and "agency" predi-
cates. 25 The Delagi Court, reversing the Appellate Division, Second
Department, dismissed the complaint against a foreign corporation,
holding that where a subsidiary and a parent, not commonly owned,
maintain separate corporate identities, the foreign parent is not present
within the state merely because one of its subsidiary's franchises does
business in New York.26 Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that juris-
diction could be obtained on the basis of the defendant's alleged con-
trol over its subsidiary's franchises, the Court held that the instant
facts lacked: (1) the prerequisite subsidiary-parent relationship, and
(2) a sufficient degree of control by the parent to warrant such a find-
ing.27
Plaintiff's agency argument centered on defendant's undisputed
contact with New York through a wholly-owned subsidiary, Volks-
wagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation which is the exclu-
sive importer of defendant's products and provides it with substantial
income in the form of dividends. Volkswagen of America, Inc., in
turn, franchised fourteen wholesale distributors who purchased its cars
at various delivery ports. These distributors, in turn, resold to in-
dependent franchised dealers. Distinguishing Frummer, where an
affiliate, sharing a common owner, was deemed an agent of a non-
domiciliary corporation, the Court noted that these fourteen wholesale
distributors and specifically the New York franchise were in no way
directly related to the defendant and were connected to its subsidiary
only by the distributorship agreement. Neither the defendant nor its
subsidiary owned any stock of the New York franchise. In fact, the
distributorship agreement between Volkswagen of America, Inc. and
its franchises specifically provided that Volkswagen of America, Inc.
acted "on its own behalf and for its own account; it [had] no power
or authority whatsoever to act as agent or otherwise for or on account
or on behalf of [the defendant]." 2
Thus rejecting plaintiff's assertion that defendant pursued a reg-
ular and systematic course of conduct in New York through the acts
of its subsidiary, the Court reached the question whether defendant's
2429 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
25 See Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 35 App. Div. 2d 952, 953, 317 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883
(2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), rev'd, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
26Id. at 431, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
27 Id. at 432, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
28 Id. at 430 n.1, 278 N.E.2d at 896 n.1, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 655 n.1.
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alleged control of its subsidiary's wholesale distributor and dealer
franchises subjected it to jurisdiction under CPLR 301 on the theory
that the franchises were in fact departments of the defendant. Answer-
ing this question in the negative, the Court noted that whenever a
foreign corporation has been deemed present on the basis of control,
"at least a parent-subsidiary relationship" has existed.29
Moreover, the defendant's alleged control of the franchises through
standardized service departments, a minimum sale requirement, and
a prior approval policy, if proven, was deemed insufficient to make the
New York franchise a "mere department" of the defendant.30
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the rule that advertising by a
defendant's subsidiary on behalf of its parent in New York media could
not subject the defendant to jurisdiction here, it being no more than
"mere solicitation" of business. 31 The Court thus distinguished Gel-
land v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,32 where a Nevada corporation was
considered "present" within the state on the basis of the activities of
an independent travel agent. This jurisdictional "agent" did publicity
work for the defendant and confirmed reservations for its Grand Can-
yon tour. The agent's bookings constituted three-sevenths of the defen-
dant's business for that tour ($120,000).
The Delagi Court, however, indicated that this profit element is
not controlling, noting that "mere sales of a manufacturer's product
in New York, however substantial, have never made the foreign cor-
poration manufacturer amenable to suit in this jurisdiction."33
A very liberalized interpretation of the "presence" required under
CPLR 301 raises a constitutional issue: what contact beyond "mere
solicitation" reasonably justifies burdening a foreign or non-domiciliary
corporation with the litigation of a cause of action not arising here and
which may be unrelated to its contact here? In Hanson v. Denckla,3 4
the Supreme Court broadly answered this question, stating that
there [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully
20 Id. at 432, 278 N.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 657, citing Public Adm'r of County of
New York v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 NXE.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967);
Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 15 N.Y2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Ys.2d 129
(1965).
30 29 N.Y.2d at 432, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 657, citing Fergus Motors, Inc. v.
Standard-Triumph Motor Co., 130 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
3129 N.Y.2d at 432, 278 NXE.2d at 898, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 657, citing Miller v. Surf Proper-
ties, Inc., 4 N.Y2d 475, 151 NXE2d 874, 176 N.YS.2d 318 (1958).
32 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
33 29 N.Y.2d at 433, 278 N.E.2d at 898, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
24 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.35
The appellate division had upheld jurisdiction on the basis of the
broad language of Frummer and Gelfand. By rejecting this approach,
the Court of Appeals remained within the boundaries expressed in
Hanson. From a pragmatic viewpoint, German Volkswagenwerk AG's
activities were only those basic to engaging in international commerce
- establishment of a subsidiary and shipment of goods to it. Certainly,
these activities, indistinct from those employed in interstate commerce,
are not a basis for in personam jurisdiction.
CPLR 325(d): Damages sought limited by monetary jurisdiction in
lower court after transfer by supreme court without plaintiff's consent.
CPA 110-b provided that the written consent of the plaintiff was
necessary to transfer a case from the supreme court to a lower court.36
In 1962, however, a new state constitution was adopted. Article VI,
section 19(a), provides that
[t]he supreme court may transfer any action or proceeding, except
one over which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction which does not
depend upon the monetary amount sought, to any other court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the subject matter within the judicial depart-
ment provided that such court has jurisdiction over the classes of
persons named as parties.37
This provision has generally been viewed as self-executing s8 It was
devised to enable the supreme court to directly relieve its calendar
congestion. 9 Article VI, section 19(k), of the state constitution states
that
[t]he legislature may provide that the verdict or judgment in ac-
tions and proceedings so transferred shall not be subject to the
limitation of monetary jurisdiction of the court to which the ac-
tions and proceedings are transferred if the limitation be lower
than that of the court in which the actions and proceedings were
originated.40
85 Id. at 253.
36 Martirano v. Valger, 19 App. Div. 2d 544, 240 N.YS2d 792 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.).
CPLR 325(c) incorporates this consent requirement.
37 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 19(a) (McKinney 1969).
38 American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bova, 32 App. Div. 2d 527, 300 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Ist
Dep't 1969) (mem.); Turntables, Inc. v. M.B. Plastics Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 792, 297
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam); Trussell v. Strongo, 29 App. Div. 2d 851, 288
N.Y.S.2d 125 (ist Dep't 1968) (per curiam); Garland v. Raunhein, 29 App. Div. 2d 383,
288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L.
Ray. 302, 316 (1968); 1 WK&M 325.04.
89 The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 330 (1969).
40 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(k) (McKinney 1969).
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